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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents a theoretical model with micro-foundations that captures some important 
features of Pakistan's economy which have emerged in sixty-four years of its history. A 
comparison of Pakistan’s economic performance during different regimes shows that 
macroeconomic fundamentals tend to show an improvement during the autocratic regimes as 
compared with those prevailing during democratic regimes. In particular, periods of autocratic 
regimes are typically characterized by low inflation, robust growth and low level of bureaucratic 
corruption due to better governance. In contrast, the economic performance during the 
democratic regimes has been observed to worsen with weak governance and high levels of 
corruption, high inflation due partly to reliance on seigniorage to finance public spending, and 
lackluster growth. Using annual data from 1950 to 2011, computational modeling is carried out 
by applying Markov-Regime switching technique with maximum-likelihood procedures. The 
estimation results based on empirical modeling setup are supportive of the above stylized-facts 
and also confirm the implications of the theoretical model.   
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“Countries that have pursued distortionary macroeconomic policies, including high 
inflation, large budget deficits and misaligned exchange rates, appear to have suffered 
more macroeconomic volatility and also grown more slowly during the postwar period. 
Does this reflect the causal effect of these macroeconomic policies on economic 
outcomes? One reason to suspect that the answer may be no is that countries pursuing 
poor macroeconomic policies also have weak „„institutions,‟‟ including political institutions 
that do not constrain politicians and political elites, ineffective enforcement of property 
rights for investors, widespread corruption, and a high degree of political instability.” 
 
Acemoglu et al., (2003) 
 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
 
Political regimes in Pakistan have strongly influenced the economic outcomes. Whereas the 
autocratic regimes have tended to exhibit good economic performance with low and stable 
inflation, robust growth, and fiscal discipline helped by relatively high revenue generation and 
checks on public expenditure, the democratic regimes have been marked by macroeconomic 
instability and sluggish economic growth. In addition, autocratic regimes also witnessed 
relatively stable external sector along with low trade deficit and high capital inflows in the form of 
foreign direct investments and portfolio investments, which indicates high level of confidence of 
foreign investors in the domestic economy. On the other hand, key economic indicators have 
generally deteriorated during different episodes of democratic regimes.1 Table 1 summarizes 
the relative performance of selected macroeconomic variables across different political regimes.   
 
Table 1: Performance of Selected Macroeconomic Indicators across Political Regimes 
Regime* RGDPgr TFPgr PINVgr BBR ER INF UR M2gr Corrp Gov 
1 3.18 2.10 22.14 -5.41 3.41 3.54 0.15 8.30 1.83 6.88 
2 2.74 0.09 2.73 -9.11 4.55 4.38 0.10 10.41 3.13 6.25 
3 5.69 1.19 7.45 -11.04 4.76 2.71 0.84 10.80 3.50 3.95 
4 5.35 1.28 6.19 -9.24 4.76 3.80 1.85 9.42 3.00 3.50 
5 3.67 -0.98 -2.46 -6.88 7.81 6.70 1.94 10.04 1.67 3.47 
6 4.87 0.62 8.49 -9.44 9.90 16.69 2.32 18.87 1.50 6.27 
7 6.45 1.67 4.94 -8.59 13.67 7.27 3.70 15.62 2.05 6.17 
8 5.12 0.40 4.81 -9.57 22.87 9.30 4.37 16.48 2.00 3.89 
9 2.44 -2.81 3.84 -9.09 28.11 9.83 4.70 17.77 2.00 4.75 
10 4.69 -0.20 1.27 -7.01 34.85 11.72 5.43 15.35 2.23 7.94 
11 2.17 -1.78 -0.33 -7.64 43.08 9.81 6.00 13.37 2.96 9.96 
12 3.48 -0.02 0.84 -6.29 52.53 5.39 6.85 9.75 2.35 9.96 
13 5.45 1.71 7.05 -4.52 60.02 6.57 7.06 16.35 2.67 5.60 
14 3.68 1.90 7.28 -7.83 62.63 12.00 5.20 15.35 2.00 6.50 
15 2.62 -0.77 -8.92 -5.47 82.68 15.43 5.78 12.63 1.00 8.60 
Variable List: RGDPgr = Average growth of real gross domestic product; TFPgr = Average growth of total factor productivity; 
PINVgr=Average growth of real private investment; BBR = Average of Budget Balance ratio to GDP (in percent); ER = Average 
Exchange rate; INF = Average inflation rate (in percent); UR = Average Unemployment rate; M2gr = Average growth in broad 
money (M2); Corrp = Aveage level of Corruption and Gov = Average Level of Governance.   
* For political regime categorization, please refer to table A4 in appendix. Further, shaded rows represent autocratic regimes. 
   Source: Author’s calculations. For data sources and description of variables, please refer section 3. 
 
                                                          
1
 For comprehensive comparison of both regimes, see Iqbal et al., (2008), and Zaidi (2006).  
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 The economy grew more than 5 percent per annum on average during autocratic 
regimes, which is 1.5 percentage points higher than the average growth rate observed during 
democratic regimes. Similarly, in all autocratic regimes, average economic growth remained 
above 5 percent with the exception of the second regime in which average economic growth 
was 2.74 percent. However, in the case of all democratic regimes average annual growth 
remained in the range from 2 percent to 5 percent. Therefore, more than 5 percent average 
annual growth across all autocratic regimes signifies the relatively strong macroeconomic 
fundamentals during these regimes. Similarly, growth in total factor productivity (TFP) during 
autocratic regimes outstripped the same in democratic eras: average annual growth of TFP 
during autocratic regimes was 1.19 percent as compared with TFP growth of -0.15 percent 
during the democratic regimes. A look at other macroeconomic indicators also shows that the 
economic performance during the autocratic regimes has been much better than that observed 
during the democratic regimes. For example, real private investment is a leading indicator of 
confidence the general public has in the government and its policies. Growth performance of 
real investment in autocratic eras has been far better than in the democratic regimes. Average 
growth in real investment in autocratic regimes was 5.67 percent per annum as compared with 
3.70 percent during the democratic regimes.  
Autocratic regimes have also outperformed the democratic regimes in terms of fiscal 
discipline and price stability. Consider, for example, the budget balance ratio which is the ratio 
of fiscal balance to GDP; the higher the ratio in absolute terms the worse is the fiscal position. 
Barring short periods where democratic regimes have a slight edge over autocratic regimes, the 
former have mostly outperformed the latter in terms of fiscal discipline: average budge balance 
ratio in autocratic regimes is -8.1 percent whereas in democratic regimes the same is -7.9 
percent. In terms of price stability, the democratic regimes have often been marked by high 
levels of inflation: average inflation in autocratic regimes stood at 4.9 percent per annum as 
compared with 10 percent for democratic regimes.  
What factors could explain the differences in economic performance during autocratic 
and democratic regimes? A growing and influential body of empirical research has sought to 
identify the causes of poor economic outcomes as reflected in high inflation and low economic 
growth. There is a near consensus in the literature that poor economic outcomes are often 
associated with lack of good governance and poor state institutions which promote rent seeking 
and corruption thus impeding the process of economic growth.2  
In the case of Pakistan, few studies have examined the role of governance and 
                                                          
2
 See for instance, Baumol (1990), Murphy et al., (1991), Acemoglu (1995), Mauro (1995) and Baumol (2004). 
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institutions in macroeconomic outcomes. For example, Khawaja and Khan (2009), Hussain 
(2008) and Qayyum et al., (2008) note that good governance and better institutional quality are 
necessary conditions for batter economic outcomes. Siddique and Ahmed (2010a, 2010b) 
investigate the long run positive relationship between institutional quality and economic growth. 
They find unidirectional causality running from institutional quality to economic growth. Another 
recent study by Zakria and Fida (2011) finds indirect effects of democracy on economic growth. 
Similarly, Qureshi et al., (2010) and Khan and Saqib (2011) find positive and significant impact 
of political instability (where political instability is defined as frequent cabinet changes and 
government in crises) on inflation in Pakistan.  
The above studies are mostly empirical in nature and lack theoretical foundations 
without which it is difficult to explain how governance, democracy, political instability, quality of 
institutions and other deeper determinants impact inflation and growth. This study fills the gap in 
the literature by developing a theoretical model with micro-foundations that captures some of 
the highlighted features of Pakistan's economy. Furthermore, using actual data, computational 
modeling is done by applying Markov-Regime switching technique with maximum-likelihood 
procedures. The estimation results based on empirical modeling setup are in line with the 
stylized-facts and also confirm the intuitive implications of the theoretical model.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature that 
explores the links between corruption, quality of governance, inflation and economic growth. 
Section 3 presents theoretical model. Section 4 describes data and empirical methodology. 
Main findings are discussed in section 5 and the concluding remarks are stated in section 6. 
 
2. HOW CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE LEAD TO INFLATION AND ECONOMIC  
    GROWTH?  
 
Cross country studies provide many plausible explanations of persistence of high inflation with 
low economic growth. In general, high inflation might be associated with market imperfections, 
exchange rates fluctuations, cost-push factors such as food supply shortages, energy inflation in 
the case of oil importing countries and conventional demand pull factors including private 
consumption and government expenditures. But research brings a common synthesis that in the 
long run inflation can persist only when there is excessive money supply growth [see for 
instance, McCandless and Weber (1995), David and Kanago (1998) and Fischer et al, (2002)]. 
Several empirical studies on inflation-growth nexus have found that high and persistent inflation 
is harmful to economic growth whereas low and stable inflation is considered as conducive for 
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the process of economic growth. For example, Khan and Senhadji (2001) estimate the threshold 
levels of inflation both for advance and emerging economies. They find that up to these 
threshold levels growth is positively related with inflation and beyond these levels, inflation 
exerts a negative effect on economic growth. In particular, the threshold estimates are 1-3 
percent and 7-11 percent for industrial and developing countries, respectively. Figure 1 shows 
the relationship between CPI inflation and real GDP growth and between CPI inflation and M2 
growth for OECD3 (organization for economic corporation and development) and developing 
countries4 for the sample 1984 to 2010.  
 
Figure 1: Relationships of CPI Inflation with Economic Growth and Broad Money Growth 
 
                  Source: Author‟s calculations based on International Financial Statistics of IMF Database. 
This figure shows positive relationship between CPI inflation and M2 growth for both 
panels of countries. For developing countries this relationship is much stronger as compared 
                                                          
3
 List of OECD countries: Australia, Austria , Belgium , Canada , Denmark, Finland, France,  Greece , Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
4
 List of Developing Countries: Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
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with OECD case. Similarly, it shows negative relationship between CPI inflation and Real GDP 
growth for both the panels. In developing countries inflation normally persists at high levels so 
the negative relationship in this case is much stronger as compared with OECD countries where 
inflation remains below its threshold level. These observations confirm that high inflation is 
harmful for economic growth especially for emerging countries and it is mainly determined by 
high growth in money supply. 
Apart from monetarist interpretations of high inflation coupled with low economic growth, 
recent research provides better explanations of the causes of high money growth and hence 
inflation. Rahmani and Yousefi (2009) classify these explanations into three broad categories: a) 
political business cycle theories of inflation determination; b) time inconsistency theory of 
optimal planning; and c) seigniorage explanations of high rate of money growth and inflation. 
The literature on political business cycle (PBC) theories provides two main explanations 
for sustained inflation: political instability with deficit bias hypothesis and war of iteration 
philosophy. The seminal attempts by Nordhaus (1975) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) relate 
political instability to deficit bias as a possible determinant of inflation both in the long and short 
run spans. Nordhaus (1975) argues that with expectations augmented Phillips curve (EAPC) 
where expectations are assumed to be adaptive, there could be a likelihood of higher than 
social optimal inflation rate in the long-run. Alesina (1987), Alesina (1989), Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988) consider rational expectations approach as opposed to adaptive expectation schemes 
and come up with similar results. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) invoke deficit bias hypothesis and 
explain that alternating governments are either uncertain of each others’ preferences or they 
disagree over the composition of public spending that gives rise to excessively high budget 
deficits. This deficit bias thus yields suboptimal outcomes which put pressure on inflation in both 
short and long run. Thus in this case inflation is a result of opportunistic behavior by alternative 
governments that are in office and try to influence myopic voters for reelection.  
Alesina and Drazen (1991) expound the war of attrition philosophy which is the 
extension of Hibbs’ (1977) findings. These studies focus on the cyclical behavior of the 
economy and consider inflation as the result of ideological differences of political parties that 
come to power alternately within a setting of asymmetric information among key political parties. 
The higher the number of political parties in a legislative council, the higher the likelihood of 
conflict, the harder it is to reach agreements and the higher the increase in fiscal which 
ultimately leads to high inflation. 
The second line of research attempts to explain the reasons of high inflation rates within 
an optimal planning framework with time inconsistency problems. These problems occur as a 
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result of the game between policy making authorities and the private sector agents. The seminal 
attempts in this direction are Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a), Barro 
and Gordon (1983b), Backus and Driffill (1985) and Rogoff(1985). These studies explain the 
high money supply growth and inflation rates by using game theoretic approaches. The main 
argument is that the policy makers in certain cases take advantage of discretionary powers with 
the assumption of asymmetric information while preparing policies to reduce unemployment or 
to increase economic growth at the cost of higher inflation. Private agents on the other hand are 
rational and aware of these hidden incentives. They do not trust policy rules unless some kind of 
strict commitments exist. Therefore, credibility plays a major role in such cases. This body of 
research also proposes reputation and delegation as possible solutions to lower money growth 
and inflation rates. 
The third line of research for explaining high inflation rate is seigniorage. Khan and 
Saqib (2011) and Carlstom and Fuerst (2000) consider a weak form of fiscal theory of price 
level (weak-form FTPL) determination. According to the theory of optimal taxation 5 , the 
government tries to equate the marginal cost of inflation tax with the marginal cost of output 
taxes in order to minimize the distortions of taxation. Therefore, the government may choose to 
use seigniorage as a way to finance public expenditures and budget deficit. Recent studies 
including Telartar et al., (2010), Aisen and Veiga (2008), Aisen and Veiga (2006), Cukeirman et 
al. (1992) and Paldem (1987) also provide similar arguments that economies with political 
instability and weak institutions lack an efficient tax system, which results in reliance on 
seigniorage. To meet the demand for public expenditures governments print more money which 
eventually leads to higher inflation. 
It is generally accepted that these three explanations for high money growth and high 
inflation can help in understanding the situation in developing countries. However, there could 
be some other plausible reasons due to the existence of bad governance, poor quality of 
institutions and high level of corruption activities in developing countries which can cause high 
inflation rates along with low economic growth. Figure 2 shows the relationship between 
governance and corruption with CPI inflation and real GDP growth for sixty OECD and 
developing countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
5
 See, for instance, Phelps (1973), Vegh (1989), and Aizenman (1992). 
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Figure 2: Relationships of CPI Inflation and Economic Growth with Corruption and Governance 
 
            Source: Author‟s calculations based on International Financial Statistics of IMF Database and International  
                         Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. 
 
This figure shows that less corruption and good governance is negatively related with 
average CPI inflation and positively related with real GDP growth. There are a number of 
reasons that can explain these stylized facts: a) corruption may cause a misallocation of talent 
and skills away from productive (entrepreneurial) activities [Acemoglu (1995) and Murphy et al., 
(1991)]; b) corruption may undermine the protection of the property rights, create obstacles to 
doing business and impede innovation and technological transfer [Hall and Jones (1999) and 
North (1990)]; d) corruption may cause firms to expand less rapidly, to adopt inefficient 
technologies and to shift their operations to the informal sector [Svensson, (2005)]; e) corruption 
may limit the extent of a country’s trade openness and reduce inflows of foreign investment 
[Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) and Wei (2000)]; f) corruption may lead to costly concealment 
and detection of illegal income, resulting in a deadweight loss of resources [Blackburn et al. 
(2006) and Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007)]; g) corruption may compromise human 
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development through a deterioration in the scale and quality of public health and education 
programs [Blackburn and Sarmah (2008), Gupta et al. (2000) and Reinikka and Svensson 
(2005)]; and h) corruption may cause a general misallocation of public expenditures as certain 
areas of spending are targeted more for their capacity to generate bribes than their potential to 
improve living standards [Gupta et al. (2001), Mauro (1995) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)].  
In terms of public finances, corruption and poor governance may independently impact 
both the expenditure and revenue sides of the government′s budget: for any given state of the 
latter, corruption can distort the composition of expenditures in ways described above; for any 
given state of the former, corruption can alter the manner by which revenues must be 
generated, as suggested by other empirical evidence. Thus Ghura (1998), Imam and Jacobs 
(2007) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997, 2000) conclude that corruption reduces total tax revenues 
by reducing the revenues from almost all taxable sources. The implication is that, ceteris 
paribus, other means of raising income must be sought, and one of the most tempting of these 
is seigniorage. Significantly, it has been found that inflation is positively related to the incidence 
of corruption, see for instance, Al-Marhubi (2000) and Rahmani and Yousefi (2009). These 
studies also noted that corruption causes inflation to increase directly by increasing government 
expenditures and therefore budget deficit that is financed by seigniorage. However, there is an 
indirect channel through which corruption increase the inflation rate. Since the growth rate of 
GDP is lower when corruption is higher and since the inflationary effect of the growth in the 
money supply is higher when the growth rate of GDP is lower, the higher the inflation rate the 
higher is corruption. 
 
3    DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
This section provides a detailed description of the theoretical model explicitly outlining its micro-
foundations. 6  The model economy consists of private households, public officials, firms and 
government as representative agents. Every agent tries to optimize its objective function subject 
to its constraints. The model links corruption motives of public officials and governance behavior 
of government with different political regimes. These links have implications for the role of 
corruption and governance on inflation and growth which are discussed in the results section of 
the paper.    
   
 
                                                          
6
 This model is an extension of Blackburn and Powell (2011) and Del Monte and Papagni (2001). 
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3.1 Agent’s Preferences 
 
The theoretical model considers an economy inhabited by a continuum of infinite-lived agents, 
who derive their lifetime utility based on consumption of private goods, tC , consumption of 
public goods and services, tS ,  and leisure, )1( tL . The agents-population is normalized to 
one and divided into a fraction, )1,0(  of private agents (or assumed to be standard 
households), who provide labor to firms and the remaining fraction, )1,0()1(   as 
bureaucrats, who work for the government as public officials. Labor supply decision of each 
agent follows standard Walrasian features. 
 
At time t, the intertemporal utility function of the representative agent is specified as: 
 
 



0
)1(,,
t
tttt
t
t LSCUU         (3.1) 
 
Where, )1,0(  is a discount factor. It is assumed that utility function is separable in each of its 
argument and its specification is given as: 
 
 
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





1
)1(
)log()log()1(,,
1
t
tttttt
L
SCLSCU     (3.2) 
 
Where,   is elasticity of labor supply and 1  is weight associated with consumption of public 
good in the agents welfare function. Utility function (3.2) also follows standard assumption about 
increasing with diminishing return in each of its argument, i.e., 0)(  tU  and 
0)(
22  tU . 
 
Each agent maximizes his/her lifetime utility function (3.1) subject to the following intertemporal 
(flow) budget constraint:  
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t
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tt AR
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
     (3.3) 
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and a sequence of cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint: 
 
 tttt
t
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1        (3.4) 
 
Where, tM  denotes nominal money holdings at time t, tA  denotes real asset holdings at time t, 
tP  denotes the general price level and tR  is the real returns on assets. The optimization 
process solves the following problem as:  
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Where, t1  and t1  are Lagrange-multipliers associated with the flow budget constraint (3.3) 
and CIA constraint (3.4) respectively. The solution to the above optimization problem (3.5) 
yields the following first order conditions (FOC’s): 
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3.2 Firm’s Behavior 
 
Each firm hires labor from private households, tL  and produces output, tY  with capital, tK  
index of technological innovation,7 tZ  and governance, tG . The production function specification 
is Cobb-Douglas which is in line with the endogenous growth literature. 8  
 
   1)( ttttt KLGZY   )1,0( ,  1    (3.11) 
 
Where, 0 . Following, Barro (1990), Huang and Wie (2006) and Choudhary et. al (2010), 
governance, tG  can be defined as: 
ttG     10        (3.12) 
 
Where, t  is a lump-sum tax paid to government on behalf of the governance and  denotes 
the parameter of governance efficiency scale. If it is less then unity then it implies that 
government is unable to translate tax revenue into effective governance. 9  
Due to long-run considerations, prices are assumed to be completely flexible and there is no 
fixed cost. The total variable cost of each firm consists of wages, ttLW , lump-sum tax cost , t
and rate of return on capital, ttKR . Firm’s profit maximization problem implies: 
 
  ttttttttt KRLWKLGZ 
  1)(     (3.13) 
 
From (3.12), we have, 
 
ttttttttt
GKL
GKRLWKLGZ
ttt 
 
1
)(max 1
,,
   
 
FOC’s are: 
 
                                                          
7
 It captures positive externality effect associated with learning-by-doing process as similar with endogenous growth 
literature. See for example: Jones (1995) and Romer (1986). 
8
 For seminal work, please refer: Barro(1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
9
 Following, Choudhary et. al, (2010), Hall and Jones (1999) and North (1990), good governance is defined in terms 
of institutional credibility, effective laws/regulations and infrastructure stability which favors production process. 
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


0
tL
  t
t
t W
L
Y
          (3.14) 



0
tK
  t
t
t R
K
Y
 )1(         (3.15) 



0
tG
  


1

t
t
G
Y
        (3.16) 
 
These FOC’s simply state that on optimum marginal products are equal to their respective 
prices. Further due to the consideration of Walrasian features, there is no markup associated 
with any price. 
 
3.3 Behavior of Bureaucratic Corruption across Political Regimes 
 
In order to model bureaucratic corruption, it is assumed that a fraction, )1,0( , of public 
officials is involved in corruption by embezzling public funds. This creates a leakage in the 
government revenues which puts pressures on government to make less expenditure on public 
infrastructure. This can be observed by simply linking corruption with governance efficiency 
scale. Following, Svensson (1995) we assume that   is inversely linked with  . Therefore, 
(3.16) can be written as: 



1
t
t
G
Y
       
(3.17) 
 
This implies that an increase in the level of bureaucratic corruption leads toward less-effective 
governance. So in this way government can directly affect a firm’s net-worth, an assumption 
consistent with Choudhary et. al (2010). However, outcome of this type of bureaucratic 
corruption is uncertain because of the changing nature of political regimes. An autocratic 
regime, where government aims at good governance, bears a monitoring cost in order to reduce 
the level of corruption. Following, Del Monte and Papagni (2001), it is assumed that on optimal 
government imposes a penalty of getting caught, which is exactly equal to the monetary value of 
monitoring cost. While maintaining the assumption of risk neutrality, the bureaucrat maximizes 
expected profits as: 
 
  tttBE   )1()(       (3.18) 
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Where,   is the probability of getting caught which is defined as: 2)2/1(  . This implies 
that as corruption rises, probability of getting caught also rises with the penalty rate  . The 
Optimization problem yields the following solution: 
 
     0)2/1()( 2 





tt
BE   
    01 t  


1
         (3.19) 
Hence, as penalty rate rises bureaucratic corruption reduces. Using (3.19) it is easy to define 
political regimes as politically stable and politically instable as: 
 
 
  (a) 0lim 

 
   1   : Politically Sable Regime 
 
  (b) 
 0
lim
 
   0  : Politically Instable Regime 
 
In politically stable regime, as penalty rate rises, bureaucratic corruption reduces. This reduction 
causes increase in governance efficiency scale. It promotes favorable conditions for firms to 
produce more and on aggregate, the economy wide output increases.   
 
3.4 Government 
 
In our model economy, the government performs the following tasks. It receives tax revenues 
from firms in exchange of the governance it provides. Among these tax revenues, it makes 
expenditures on public infrastructure at the rate, )1,0(  and also pays salaries to public 
officials, ttLW)1(  . Since a fraction of public officials is involved in corruption there is a 
possible leakage of the available tax revenue which otherwise can be available for 
expenditures. Hence, corruption causes deficit in the government fiscal balance. This deficit is 
finance by monetary seigniorage, )( 1 tt HH  
which ultimately causes inflation in the economy. 
Thus, the government budget constraint is the following: 
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  tttt
t
t LW
P
H
m
m
 )1()1(
1







     (3.20) 
 
Where, t)1(   is the remaining amount of public funds after corruption and m  is the rate of 
growth in monetary base defined as: 
1
1


t
tt
H
HH
m . Therefore, in this way on aggregate both 
weak governance and corruption are positively associated with high inflationary due to high 
dependency on monetary seigniorage and, reduce output by effecting firms's net-worth via 
(3.17) and (3.19) channels. 
  
Hence, as (3.17), (3.19) and (3.20) confirm that as stable political regime comes into power, 
governance increases and bureaucratic corruption reduces thus increasing output and slowing 
down the inflationary process. Unstable political regime reverses the whole scenario. Therefore, 
both governance and corruption have different implications on inflation and growth in different 
political regimes. 
 
3.5 Solution of the theoretical Model 
 
Due to long run considerations, we will restrict our model solution to the balance growth 
equilibrium of the model. For simplicity, it is assumed that the steady state growth rate of all real 
variables is  . For solution, we need to collect all equilibrium conditions of the model with the 
assumptions that capital and money markets are clear in the long run, i.e. tt KA   and 
tt HM  . The equilibrium conditions, therefore, are: 
 
(a) tt
tC
21
1
   
(b) tt
tS
21 

  
(c) ttt WL 1)1( 
     
(e)   1211121 )1(   ttttt R    
-17- 
 
(f)  121111)1(   tttt     
t
t
t
P
P 1
11

   
(g) tttt
t
t AASC
P
M
 

1
1  
(h) tt
t
t
ttt
t
t
tt AR
P
M
LWA
P
M
SC )1(11 

  
(i) ttG 


1
 
(j) t
t
t W
L
Y
    
(k) t
t
t R
K
Y
 )1(   
(l) 
t
t
G
Y
     
(m) tttt
t
t LW
P
H
m
m
 )1()1(
1







 
 
In the balanced-growth path tC  grows at a constant rate )1(  . So )( 21 tt    grows at 
1)1(   . Thus condition (e) implies: 111211 ))(1(   ttt r . Substituting it in (f) 
implies: 
 
   )()1)(1( 11211111    ttt  
 
By virtue of the binding CIA constraint (g), inflation is constant and inversely related to growth 
according to: 
 





1
1
1 m
         (3.21) 
(f) and (g) also yield the following result: 
 
  





1
)1)(1(
2R
       (3.22) 
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In aggregate tx  comprises the income of all agents as: 
 
  







t
t
ttttttt
L
WLWLWLx
)1(
)1()1)(1(


  
 
After simplification and substituting equilibrium conditions we have: 
 
  tt
t
t YY
Y
x 





 





      
(3.23) 
 
CIA and agents budget constraint simultaneously simplifies with equilibrium conditions as: 
 
  tt
t
t RKx
P
H
  
Therefore, 
  ttt
t
t YYY
P
H












 





1)1(  
 
Substituting it in (m) we get: 
 
ttttt LWY
m
m



)1()1(1
1








 
 
After simplification we get: 
 
 
 
 
 



)1()1(
)1()1()1()1(
1 





m
m
 
 
 
 

)1()1(
)1()1(
1 


m
m
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 


)1(
)1()1(


m  
Hence, 
 



)1(
)1()1(


 m      (3.24) 
 
Hence, (3.19), (3.21) and (3.24) show that in the presence of corruption, an increase in 
governance inefficiency leads to inflationary pressure along with low economic growth.   
 
4    DESCRIPTION OF EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
This section briefly outlines the empirical setup by illustrating data, specification of econometric 
models and regime switching estimation methodology used in this paper. 
 
4.1 Data 
 
To estimate the model parameters, data over the annual frequencies from 1950 to 2011 on 
fourteen macroeconomic/political variables are used: the inflation rate based on consumer price 
index (CPI); real gross domestic product (Real GDP); per capita output; trade shares in terms of 
GDP as a proxy of openness; agriculture output shares in terms of GDP; nominal exchange rate 
of Pak-Rupees in terms of US dollars; government borrowing; fiscal balance ratio as percent of 
GDP;  private sector credit; international oil prices; avg. year of schooling as proxy of human 
capital; central bank governor turnover; index of corruption and index of governance. Details on 
the construction and the sources of the data set are provided in table A1 of appendix-A. 
Descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlation matrix of above mentioned variables are also 
reported in table A2 and table A3 of appendix-A. These correlations are consistent with the 
standard theory. The results based on descriptive statistics show that average levels of 
corruption and governance for the complete sample are 2.24 and 6.21 respectively. The low 
values of corruption and governance indices indicate high levels of corruption along with poor 
governance. The average inflation and economic growth for the complete sample are 7.5 and 
5.0 respectively. The correlation coefficients of corruption with inflation and growth are -0.48 and 
0.11. These negative values show positive relationship of corruption with inflation and positive 
correlation values of corruption with growth shows negative relationship. Similarly, pair-wise 
correlation values show negative relationship of governance with inflation and positive 
relationship of governance with growth.  
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4.2 Specification of the Econometric Models 
 
Following standard practices, we specify two econometric models, one for the explanation of 
inflation and second for economic growth. The approach followed here is to add corruption and 
governance in both the models as explanatory variables along with the standard determinants of 
inflation and economic growth. In order to examine the interactions of governance and 
corruption with inflation and growth across different political regimes, we find it useful to 
estimate econometric models with Markov-Regime switching approach. This approach enables 
us to examine the varying nature of deeper determinants across different regimes. The 
specification of growth model is consistent with Barro (1991), Hall and Jones (1999), Ahmed 
and Danish (2010a, 2010b) and Zakaria and Fida (2011); whereas the specification of the 
econometric model for inflation is consistent with Al-Marhubi (2000), Rahmani and Yousefi 
(2009), Khan and Saqib (2011). These specifications are given as: 
 
ttsttstttt
ttttttt
govcorrupTurnoverCBGovernerOilpPvtCredit
FBRingGovtBorrowExRateAgriOutputopennpcy
inf,,2,1987
6543210inf




 
 
and 
 
tytsttsttt
ttttttt
govcorrupHCOilp
PvtCreditFBRingGovtBorrowAgriOutputopenny
,,2,187
6543210 inf




 
 
Where; inf := CPI inflation rate; y :=real GDP growth; pcy :=per capita output growth; 
openn := trade shares as percent of GDP; ExRate :=nominal exchange rate; GovtBorrowing := 
net budgetary borrowing as percent of GDP; FBR := fiscal balance ratio as percent of GDP; 
PvtCredit := growth in private sector credit; Oilp := international oil prices; CBGovernerTurnover 
:= Central Bank Governer Turnover; HC :=Human capital; corrupt := index of corruption; gov := 
index of governance and ’s := residual terms.   
Here, s' and s'  are fixed coefficients and s'  and s'  are regime switching 
coefficients. St represents the state at time t with switching to take place between autocratic and 
democratic regimes. We also allow the variance of the error terms to switch simultaneously 
between the states.  
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4.3 Markov Regime Switching Approach 
 
The Markov Regime Switching (hence after, MRS) modeling approach was originally introduced 
by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) in the field of econometrics. Cosslett and Lee (1985) have 
extended this approach by providing iterative algorithms to compute likelihood functions. This 
seminal attempt was similar in spirit of the state-space modeling using Kalman filter approach. 
Later, this approach has been used extensively in various economic applications, including 
Hamilton (1989), in the case of business cycle modeling and Engel and Hamilton (1990) for 
exchange rate analysis. To validate the outcomes of this approach various statistical tests have 
been developed. Some of the tests based on moment conditions and stationarity diagnostics 
can be found in Tjøstheim (1986), Yang (2000) and Francq and Zakoïan (2001). A 
comprehensive textbook treatment of this approach can be found in Hamilton (1994). 
In our case, this approach allows us to estimate how much bureaucratic corruption and 
governance quantitatively impacts inflation and economic growth across different political 
regimes. Some of the technical details are given below. 
Let us assume a time series, t , (let it denotes inflation rate) with its conditional density 
function: );|( 1  ttf  where; 1t  is the information set which contains past values and other 
explanatory variables and   is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The simplest two-
state case in which the structural changes occur at the particular time, 1tt  , its density function 
changes to );,1|( 1  ttf  for 1t  observations and );,2|( 1  ttf  for other 1ttn   
observations. The corresponding likelihood functions are: 


1
0
1 );,1|(
t
t
ttf   and 




1
0
1 );,2|(
tt
t
tt
n
f  . For example, the time series ,tit uu   where ).,0(...~
2
it diiu   
For i = 
1, 2, the density function is: 




 
  2
2
2
1
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2
1
exp
)1416.3(2
1
);,|(
i
it
i
tt
u
if



 . In order to 
model multiple regime shifts, we can replace the index i in the density function );,|( 1  tt if  
by a discrete variable St, whose possible values are 1, 2, . . . , k and the density function 
generalizes to );,|( 1  ttt Sf . Thus St, can be considered as a regime indicator which is 
serially dependent upon St-1, St-2, …, St-k, in which case the regime switching process is referred 
to as a kth order Markov switching process. It is important to note that St, has its own distribution 
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which cannot be observed, which means that we cannot construct the likelihood function by 
using );,|( 1  ttt Sf . Consequently, we must have the density function );|( 1  ttf  by 
eliminating the unobserved term St. If the past information 1t  does not help in evaluating the 
distribution of St, we can use an approach here: we consider a conditional likelihood, 
)|( 1ttSP , and multiply it to the conditional density );,|( 1  ttt Sf : 
 


 
J
s
ttttttt
t
SPSff
1
111 )|();,|();|(                            (4.1) 
 
The unobserved term St can be eliminated by summing up all the possible values of it. The 
corresponding likelihood is: 
 
 
  
 
T
t
T
t
k
s
ttttttt
t
SPSff
1 1 1
111 )|();,|();|(     (4.2) 
 
This log-likelihood function from (4.2) can be written as: 
 
  
  
 
T
t
T
t
k
s
ttttttt
t
SPSffL
1 1 1
111 )|();,|(ln);|(lnln   (4.3) 
 
This function is a weighted average of the density functions for multiple regimes, with 
weights being the probability of each regime.  Finally this MRS representation is used to 
estimate the model with explanatory variables with endogenous regime switching.  
 
For solution algorithms, Hamilton (1994) simplifies the analysis to the cases where the 
density function of t  depends only on finitely many past values of St: 
 
);,,...,,|();,,|( 1111    tmtttttttt SSSfSSf                   (4.4) 
 
for some finite integer m, and the corresponding conditional likelihood is 
)|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP , with the assumption that St follows a first-order Markov chain: 
ststttttt pSSPSSP 1111 )|(),|(   , where the transition probability, tt ssp 1 , is specified as a 
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constant coefficient that is independent of time t (time-invariant). The conditional likelihood 
)|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP  can then be calculated iteratively through two equations as follows: 
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for t = 2, 3. . . . , T. Note that the left-hand side term )|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP  differs from the 
second term on the right-hand side )|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP  in that all of the St terms are one 
period ahead. The term, )|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP , in which the first St-1 term and 1t  are both 
subscripted by the same period of time, is then computed as follows: 
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for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Given initial values, )|,...,,( 01 mttt SSSP  , we can calculate 
)|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP  by using (4.5) and (4.6) iteratively, as discussed in Kim and Nelson 
(1999). Now to determine the initial values, )|,...,,( 01 mttt SSSP  , we first note that if we 
further assume that ,)|(),...,,|( 11021 jj ssjjjjj PSSPSSSP     for j = 0, 1, 2, . . ., 
then we have: )|()|,...,,,( 0)1(0)1(11 )2()1(11      mssssssm SPpppSSSSP mm .  
Given the m terms of transition probabilities )2()1(11  mm ssssss ppp  , we have to 
determine k values for the )|( )1( YsP m   term for the k possible states of s-(m-1). The easiest 
approach is to assume they are some given constants such as the same number k−1 for each 
of them. Hamilton (1994) also provides an alternative way to find these initial values, i.e. to 
consider these as fixed parameters just like the way the transition probabilities ststp 1  are 
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assumed to be fixed parameters. Therefore, this approach starts the filter at time t=1, and the 
initial values are obtained from ordinary least square regression. Once the coefficients of the 
model are estimated using an iterative maximum likelihood procedure and the transition 
probabilities are generated, it can provide an easy way to use the algorithm in Kim and Nelson 
(1999) to derive the filtered probabilities for St using all the information up to time t. 
 
5    THE RESULTS 
 
This section provides a discussion of the main results based on calibration of the theoretical 
model and estimation of regime switching models of inflation and economic growth. Calibration 
results are presented in Appendix B, whereas estimation results are reported in Appendix C.  
 
5.1 Calibration Results of the Theoretical Model 
 
The deep parameter values for model calibrations are given in Table B1 of section B. Most of 
these parameter values are based on authors’ calculations except that the share of governance 
in the production function is taken from Choudhary et al., (2010). The parameter value of 
discount factor () is set in order to obtain historical mean of the nominal interest rate in the 
steady state which turns out to be 0.987 for Pakistan’s case. The value of steady state growth 
() is 6.0, which is calculated by taking long-run average of real GDP of the whole sample. 
Share of governance () in production function is set to be 0.25. The share of expenditure on 
public infrastructure () is calculated by taking the ratio of total expenditure on public 
infrastructure to GDP which turns out to be 0.45. The share of public officials (bureaucrats) in 
the economy (1-) is calculated by taking the ratio of employed labor in public sector to total 
labor force and the obtained value is 0.25. The parameter of corruption () and governance () 
are calculated from indices of bureaucratic corruption and governance. Using these parameter 
values, the theoretical model is calibrated recursively. The process of iteration is performed up 
to forty years, where the initial period is taken as 1970. It covers the full post- partition episode 
of Pakistan’s economy.10 Model simulation results for CPI inflation and real GDP growth are 
given in Table B2 and Figures B1, B2 and B3 of Appendix B. These results show that simulated 
series of the theoretical model closely mimic the actual series. The subsample results across 
different political regimes are also robust. It confirms the implications of the theoretical model 
                                                          
10
 East, West Pakistan separation. 
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that when any autocratic regime comes into power macroeconomic fundamentals tend to 
improve with slowdown in inflation, robust growth, and lower bureaucratic corruption due to 
good governance. But in the case of democratic regimes, these results are reversed: 
governance becomes weak with increase in the level of corruption. Also, the elected 
governments tend to rely more on seigniorage to finance their expenditures with adverse 
consequences for inflation and growth. The model calibration results also indicate that the 
model is quite suitable for analyzing the inflation dynamics in Pakistan: within sample inflation 
predictions outperform growth predictions which implies that inflation in Pakistan is more 
sensitive to political instability, corruption and poor governance.           
 
5.2 Estimation Results of Regime Switching Models 
 
The estimation results11 of regime switching models (RSM) are reported in Table C1. Both 
econometric models of inflation and economic growth are subdivided into two forms: one with 
corruption and second with governance. This is due to computational simplicity as parameters 
associated with these variables are varying (not fixed) subject to regime change. It reduces 
computational complexity in terms of state selection and also provides independent smoothed 
probabilities at high and low frequencies across sub political regimes. The parameters 
associated with all other explanatory variables are treated as fixed and their estimated values 
can be interpreted in the usual way.  
The first term in all RSMs is intercept which is insignificant in all the cases. It indicates 
the fitness of these RSMs showing that there are minimum risks of omitted variable bias. The 
per capita output growth is negatively related with CPI. The estimates of agriculture output 
shares in inflation regressions also provide similar results. In case of growth models, these 
results are robust. The estimation results of growth model show that Inflation contributes 
negatively to output growth. It implies that to have sustained output growth, inflation should be 
curtailed at non-harmful levels.  
Trade openness estimates in the case of inflation models appear are positive and 
significant.  One possible interpretation may be the higher propensity of imports which may put 
pressure on balance of payment position through the trade account. Worsening of balance of 
payment position means depreciation of local currency and hence ends up with high inflation. 
                                                          
11
 MATLAB package MS-Regress (developed by Marcelo Perlin (2009)) is used to estimate Multivariate Markov-
Regime Switching models with Maximum likelihood procedures.  This toolkit is freely available on internet on the 
following link: www.mathworks.com  [Reference: Parlin, M. (2009). MS-Regress: A package for Markov-Regime 
Switching Models in MATLAB. Matlab central: File Exchange] 
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Similarly, estimation results of growth models show trade openness as a positive and significant 
determinant of output growth, because it is associated with productivity improvements resulting 
from enhanced competitiveness. 
The results of RSM1 and RSM2 show that Inflation is positively related to nominal 
exchange rate and negatively to output growth. Again being a net importer, any depreciation of 
local currency will have an adverse impact on inflation and economic growth. The government 
borrowing ratio is positively associated with inflation and negatively with output growth. The 
higher is the government borrowing from the domestic financial sector the higher will be the 
crowding out of the private sector resulting in low economic activity and low level of output 
growth.  
The fiscal balance ratio is negatively related to inflation which basically shows that 
higher deficit is accompanied with higher inflation. As with the majority of developing countries, 
due to lower credit rating in international market, the main source of financing the fiscal deficit is 
borrowing from internal sources. Higher fiscal deficit affects the rate of inflation in two ways; first 
by directly increasing inflation and, second by increasing the government borrowing which in 
turn impacts the rate of inflation. But surprisingly, it has a negative association with output 
growth which means that higher fiscal deficit will bring a higher level of output growth. The fiscal 
balance ratio is statistically significant in the model but its contribution in explaining output 
growth is marginal.  
The private sector credit is negatively associated with inflation, which shows that private 
sector credit stimulates output which helps in curtailing inflation. This result is in contrast with 
earlier findings. Although private sector credit is statistically significant but its contribution in the 
explanation of inflation in the model is marginal. The private sector credit is positively related to 
output growth showing that access to the financial resources stimulates economic activity and 
hence output growth.  
As Pakistan is a net oil importer, inflation is positively related to international oil prices. 
The estimation results of inflation models confirm this scenario. Due to scarce financial 
resources, any hike in international oil prices is passed on to domestic consumers leading to 
higher cost of transportation and increase in prices of consumer items. Similar to the estimates 
of the inflation model, the growth model estimates show that international oil prices are 
negatively associated with economic growth.   
Inflation is positively associated with central bank governor turnover, which means that 
frequent changes in the top leadership of the central bank could be inflationary. One possible 
interpretation of this positive relationship may be the validity of fiscal dominance hypothesis that 
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potentially undermines central bank policy decisions on price stability. Output growth is 
positively related to human capital which is in line with the predictions of the endogenous growth 
models. A well-educated and skilled human capital can be instrumental in research and 
development, adoption of new technology and productivity improvements resulting in higher 
output growth.  
The regime switching estimates of corruption in the case of inflation model show positive 
linkages with inflation both in autocratic and democratic regimes. However, in autocratic regime, 
its magnitude is negligible, whereas in democratic regimes corruption significantly contributes 
towards high inflation. Similar results are found in the case of governance, which is negatively 
related to inflation in both the regimes. In autocratic regimes, high magnitude of governance 
implies a significant slowdown of inflation in such regimes. These dynamics can also be 
observed from Figure C1 and Figure C2 of Appendix-C, where Markov-regime switching 
probabilities of corruption and governance are plotted along with inflation. These figures show 
that democratic regimes are more vulnerable with high level of corruption and bad governance.     
The results of growth model show a negative association of corruption with economic 
growth both in autocratic and democratic regimes. Corruption significantly declines economic 
growth in democratic regimes but autocratic regimes show insignificant results. Governance 
appears is positively related to economic growth in both the regimes. In autocratic regimes, high 
magnitude of governance implies a significant surge in growth process. These results are robust 
in the case of Markov-Regime switching plots which are shown in Figure C3 and Figure C4 of 
Appendix-C, where smoothing probabilities of corruption and governance are plotted with real 
GDP growth.  These figures show that autocratic regimes tend to show better economic 
performance with robust economic growth, low level of corruption, and good governance. 
Along with regime switching estimates, autoregressive coefficients (of order 1) of the 
inflation models show high persistence. Such high persistence means inflation takes a fair 
amount of time in changing its curvature. Once the economy enters in high inflationary period, 
sustained efforts are required to get the economy back to a low level of inflation. The level of 
corruption and poor quality of governance are the main determinants of high persistence rate in 
inflation indicating that both corruption and poor governance cause continuous distortions in 
market mechanisms and price structures making inflation stubborn. However, in the case of 
economic growth, low level of persistence in output is observed indicating that output is more 
vulnerable to different types of political regimes. Sustained output growth requires corruption 
free implementation of development activities which could only be achieved with good 
governance. These findings are consistent with the implications of the theoretical models.    
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6    CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study mainly focuses on analyzing the consequences of political instability, governance 
and bureaucratic corruption on inflation and growth in the case of Pakistan. A representative 
agent model with micro-foundations and two Markov-Regime switching models of inflation and 
growth have been used. The analyses based on both these approaches show that high 
corruption along with weak governance cause high inflation and low growth. In an environment 
with weak governance, agents enhance their level of corruption resulting in leakages in public 
revenues and forcing the government to rely on seigniorage to finance public expenditures with 
adverse consequences for inflation and economic growth. Based on stylized facts, the paper 
shows that both corruption and poor governance typically coincide with political instability during 
the democratic regimes signifying the critical need to achieve political stability and to enhance 
the quality of governance for better economic outcomes. 
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Appendix-A 
 
Table A1: Description and Sources of Selected Variables 
 
S. No Variable Description / Source 
VAR1 CPI Inflation Rate 
Overall domestic inflation. This series is the annual growth rates of consumer 
price index (CPI: base 2000=100) for Pakistan. Data source of this variable is 
FBS, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR2 Real GDP Growth 
Real Gross Domestic Product (Real GDP). This series is the annual growth rates 
of Real GDP with base 2000-01. Data source of this variable is Pakistan 
Economic Survey, MOF, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR3 
Per Capital Output 
Growth 
Per capita output is calculated by taking ratio of Real GDP to total population. 
Then series is constructed by taking annual growth rates of per capita output. 
Data on total population is taken from Pakistan Economic Survey, Various issues, 
MOF, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR4 Trade Share  
Trade Shares are computed by taking ratio of total trade (total exports + total 
imports) to nominal GDP. This series is taken as proxy of trade openness. Data 
on total exports and total imports are taken from FBS, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR5 
Agriculture Output 
Share 
Agriculture output shares are calculated by taking ratio of total agriculture output 
to real GDP. Data on agriculture output is taken from Pakistan Economic Survey, 
MOF, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR6 Exchange Rate 
Bilateral nominal Exchange rate of Pakistan Rupees in terms of US Dollars. The 
data of this series is taken from the Statistics Department of the State Bank of 
Pakistan, Karachi, Pakistan. 
VAR7 
Government 
Borrowing Ratio 
Government Borrowing ratio is computed by taking ratio of net budgetary 
borrowing to GDP. The data on net budgetary borrowing is taken from Statistics 
Department of the State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi, Pakistan. 
VAR8 Fiscal Balance Ratio 
Fiscal Balance Ratio is computed by taking ratio of total budget balance (total 
revenue - total expenditure) to nominal GDP. The data on fiscal balance is taken 
from Pakistan Economic Survey, various issues, MOF, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR9 
Growth in Private 
Credit 
The series is the annual growth rates of total private sector credit. Data of this 
series is taken from Statistics Department of the State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi, 
Pakistan.  
VAR10 
International Oil 
Prices 
Data on international oil prices is taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
of International Monetary Fund database. 
VAR11 Human Capital  
Data on Human capital formation is proxy by average year of schooling. Data 
source of this variable is Barro and Lee (2010).  
VAR12 
Central Bank 
Governor Turnover 
This variable is proxy by a dummy variable. In this series, value 1 being assigned 
to all those years where governor turnover (State Bank of Pakistan) is taking 
place.   
VAR13 Index of Corruption 
Index of Corruption is taken from Barro (1991) and International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) database. This index is ranked from 0 to 10. Low index value of 
corruption shows high level of corruption. 
VAR14 Index of Governance 
Index of Governance is also taken from Barro (1991) and International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) database. This index is ranked from 0 to 10. Low index value 
of governance shows poor level of governance. 
Notes- MOF: Ministry of Finance; FBS: Federal Bureau of Statistics 
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 Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Included in Regime Switching Regressions 
 
S. No. Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Variance 
Std. 
Dev. 
Kurtosis 
No. of 
Obs. 
1. CPI Inflation Rate 7.45 6.04 27.98 -3.23 31.96 5.65 5.08 61 
2. Real GDP Growth 4.94 5.03 9.83 -1.33 5.53 2.35 -0.44 61 
3. Per Capital Output Growth 2.25 2.18 7.78 -3.70 5.30 2.30 -0.12 61 
4. Trade Share  29.45 30.14 39.30 16.56 32.25 5.68 -0.58 62 
5. Agriculture Output  0.33 0.30 0.53 0.21 0.01 0.10 -1.04 62 
6. Exchange Rate 23.50 9.99 85.55 3.31 565.19 23.77 0.11 62 
7. Government Borrowing Ratio 7.97 3.10 25.32 -2.75 75.01 8.66 -1.12 62 
8. Fiscal Balance Ratio -8.04 -8.25 -2.48 -15.80 7.41 2.72 0.02 62 
9. Growth in Private Credit 15.48 15.01 46.23 -13.82 109.33 10.46 1.01 61 
10. International Oil Prices 20.28 14.77 97.04 1.62 533.12 23.09 3.16 62 
11. Human Capital  2.18 1.83 4.90 0.85 1.59 1.26 -0.34 62 
12. 
Central Bank Governor 
Turnover 
0.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.43 -0.55 62 
13. Index of Corruption 2.24 2.00 3.50 1.00 0.63 0.79 -1.02 62 
14. Index of Governance 6.21 6.00 10.83 2.17 4.96 2.23 -0.95 62 
 
 
Table A3: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 
  Var1 Var2 Var3 Var4 Var5 Var6 Var7 Var8 Var9 Var10 Var11 Var12 Var13 Var14 
Var1 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Var2 -0.05 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Var3 -0.05 -0.21 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Var4 0.43 0.02 0.09 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - 
Var5 -0.42 -0.13 -0.19 -0.72 1.00 - - - - - - - - - 
Var6 0.27 -0.12 0.01 0.54 -0.76 1.00 - - - - - - - - 
Var7 -0.47 -0.04 -0.07 -0.66 0.72 -0.57 1.00 - - - - - - - 
Var8 0.09 -0.11 -0.04 0.26 -0.32 0.57 -0.53 1.00 - - - - - - 
Var9 -0.16 0.42 0.37 0.00 -0.01 -0.13 0.09 -0.13 1.00 - - - - - 
Var10 0.36 0.01 0.10 0.56 -0.71 0.82 -0.53 0.45 -0.04 1.00 - - - - 
Var11 0.32 -0.01 0.10 0.62 -0.85 0.97 -0.63 0.55 -0.05 0.87 1.00 - - - 
Var12 0.23 -0.21 -0.19 0.05 -0.18 0.20 -0.11 -0.06 -0.16 0.18 0.19 1.00 - - 
Var13 -0.48 0.11 0.08 -0.38 0.53 -0.50 -0.76 -0.62 0.17 -0.53 -0.55 -0.25 1.00 - 
Var14 -0.04 0.13 0.03 -0.29 0.42 -0.67 0.58 -0.58 0.07 -0.44 -0.61 -0.03 0.44 1.00 
-34- 
 
Table A4: List of Pakistan’s Political Regimes 
 
Regime* Duration Type** President / Governor Prime Minister(s) 
1 Oct 19, 1951 to Aug 07, 1955 Democratic Malik Ghulam Mohammed 
Khawaja Nazimuddin / Mohammad Ali 
Bogra 
2 Aug 07, 1955 to Oct 27, 1958 Autocratic Major General Iskandar Mirza 
Chaudhry Mohammad Ali / Hussain 
Shaheed Suharwardy / I.I. Chundrigar / 
Malik Feroze khan Noon 
3 Oct 27, 1958 to Mar 25, 1969 Autocratic Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan Post Abolished 
4 Mar 25, 1969 to Dec 20, 1971 Autocratic General Agha Mohammad Yahya khan Nurul Amin 
5 Dec 20, 1971 to Aug 14, 1973 Democratic Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Post Abolished 
6 Aug 14, 1973 to Sep 16, 1978 Democratic Chaudhry Fazal Illahi Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
7 Sep 16, 1978 to Aug  17, 1988 Autocratic General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq Muhammad Khan Junejo 
8 Aug 17, 1988 to Jul 18, 1993 Democratic Ghulam Ishaq Khan 
Benazir Bhutto /Ghulam Mustafa Khan 
Jatoi /Mian Mohammad Nawaz 
Sharif/Balakh Sher Mazari/Mian 
Mohammad Nawaz Sharif 
9 Jul 18, 1993 to Nov 14, 1993 Democratic Wasim Sajjad Moin Qureshi 
10 Nov 14, 1993 to Dec 2, 1997 Democratic Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari 
Benazir Bhutto / Malik Miraj Khalid/Mian 
Mohammad Nawaz Sharif 
11 Dec 2, 1997 to Jan 1, 1998 Democratic Wasim Sajjad Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif 
12 Jan 1, 1998 to Jun 20, 2001 Democratic Justice (Ret.) Rafique Tarrar Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif 
13 Jun 20, 2001 to Aug 18, 2008 Autocratic General Parvez Musharraf 
Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali / Chuadhary 
Shujaat Hussain / Shaukat Aziz  
14 
Aug 18, 2008 to Sep 9, 2008 Democratic Muhammad Mian Soomro  
Muhammad Mian Soomro  / Syed 
Yousaf Raza Gillani 
15 Sep 9, 2008 to Dated Democratic Asif Ali Zardari Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani 
Notes- Source: Khan and Saqib (2011). Shaded rows represent autocratic regimes. 
*Our data sample starts from 1950. Therefore, we have excluded initial two regimes,  
[Aug 14, 1947 to Sep 11, 1948, Governor: Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah] and  
[Sep 14, 1948 to Oct 19, 1951, Governor: Khawaja Nazimuddin]. 
**Type of political regimes is specified on the basis of the selection of presidents where autocratic type indicates military regime. 
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Appendix – B: Calibration Results of Theoretical Model  
 
Table B1: Parameter Values for Calibration 
Parameter Description Value Source 
  Discount Factor 0.987 Author’s Calculations 
  Steady State Growth Rate 6.000 Author’s Calculations 
  Share of ‘G’ in production function 0.250 Choudhary et al., (2010) 
  Share of expenditure on public infrastructure 0.450 Author’s Calculations 
)1(   Share of Public Officials in the economy 0.250 
Author’s Calculations based on 
Labor Survey Data 
  Parameter of Corruption [0,10] 
Recursive calculation based on 
Index of Corruption 
  Parameter of Governance [0,10] 
Recursive calculation based on 
Index of Governance 
 
 
Table B2: Model Calibration Results 
Regime* 
RGDP Growth 
(Actual)  
RGDP Growth 
(Simulated) 
CPI Inflation                 
(Actual) 
CPI Inflation                 
(Simulated) 
4 5.35 8.61 3.80 3.76 
5 3.67 8.66 6.70 5.97 
6 4.87 5.80 16.69 9.25 
7 6.45 7.48 7.27 7.08 
8 5.12 5.63 9.30 9.36 
9 2.44 5.38 9.83 9.61 
10 4.69 4.54 11.72 11.56 
11 2.17 5.94 9.81 9.27 
12 3.48 5.37 5.39 4.88 
13 5.45 6.11 6.57 6.19 
14 3.68 6.20 12.00 8.23 
15 2.62 4.48 15.43 12.03 
Note: For list of regimes, please refer table A4.  
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Figure B2: 
 
 
Notes-  Shaded area in these figures represent democratic regimes.  
Horizontal axis shows annual periods (starts from 1970). 
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Appendix – C: Regime Switching Modeling Results 
Table C1: Estimation Results Based on Regime Switching Modeling Approach 
  RSM1 RSM2 RSM3 RSM4 
 
Dependent Variables 
Regressors with Fixed coefficients CPI Inflation Rate CPI Inflation Rate Real GDP Growth Real GDP Growth 
Intercept 0.061 0.064 0.051 0.053 
 
(0.184) (0.196) (0.152) (0.183) 
CPI Inflation Rate --- --- -0.049 -0.057 
 
--- --- (0.047) (0.034) 
Real GDP Growth --- --- --- --- 
 
--- --- --- --- 
Per Capital Output Growth -0.124 -0.119 --- --- 
 
(0.031) (0.027) --- --- 
Trade Share  0.314 0.268 0.081 0.072 
 
(0.117) (0.023) (0.053) (0.061) 
Agriculture Output Share -0.247 -0.133 --- --- 
 
(0.098) (0.071) --- --- 
Exchange Rate 0.063 0.052 -0.012 -0.014 
 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.009) (0.011) 
Government Borrowing Ratio 0.307 0.249 -0.032 -0.028 
 
(0.075) (0.064) (0.015) (0.014) 
Fiscal Balance Ratio -0.192 -0.271 -0.097 -0.084 
 
(0.026) (0.037) (0.051) (0.044) 
Growth in Private Credit -0.087 -0.081 0.094 0.089 
 
(0.069) (0.064) (0.030) (0.026) 
International Oil Prices 0.081 0.076 -0.014 -0.017 
 
(0.029) (0.021) (0.008) (0.010) 
Human Capital  --- --- 0.0314 0.028 
 
--- --- (0.012) (0.011) 
Central Bank Governor Turnover 0.027 0.025 --- --- 
 
(0.016) (0.014) --- --- 
AR(1) 0.586 0.421 0.042 0.038 
 
(0.049) (0.043) (0.014) (0.013) 
Regressors with Regime Switching coefficients 
Avg. regime switching estimates of 
Corruption on autocratic regimes    -0.012 --- 0.034 --- 
 
(0.097) --- (0.019) --- 
Avg. regime switching estimates of 
Corruption on democratic regimes    -0.109 --- 0.019 --- 
 
(0.039) --- (0.011) --- 
Avg. regime switching estimates of 
governance on autocratic regimes    --- -0.063 --- 0.064 
 
--- (0.016) --- (0.021) 
Avg. regime switching estimates of 
governance on democratic regimes    --- -0.021 --- 0.020 
  --- (0.041) --- (0.008) 
Avg. Probability of autocratic Regime 
Switching States  
0.92 0.91 0.93 0.92 
Avg. Probability of democratic Regime 
Switching States 
0.95 0.94 0.94 0.92 
Avg. Duration of Autocratic Regimes 35 35 35 35 
Avg. Duration of Democratic Regimes 29 29 29 29 
Final Log Likelihood Ratios -169.24 -168.48 -126.76 -127.23 
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. 
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Figure – C1 
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Figure – C2 
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Figure – C3 
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Figure – C4 
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